Research Interests
The role of issues and domestic politics in international conflict, human rights and repression,
international alliances and their role in international conflict, international peacekeeping.
Data Collection Project
The Sub-National Analysis of Repression Project (NSF Award #1626775), with K. Chad Clay, Christopher J. Fariss, and Reed M. Wood, co-PIs and Rebecca Cordell
Peer-Reviewed Publications
2021. "Extant Commitment, Risk, and UN Peacekeeping Authorization." International Interactions (with Rebecca Cordell and Paul F. Diehl)
Abstract: Do aspects of current UN peacekeeping operations affect the willingness of that body to authorize new operations? Our theoretical arguments center on the capacity and costs of the organization – specifically the committed resources and risks associated with ongoing operations – with the assumption that greater existing commitments and perceived risks lessen the likelihood that the UN will create new operations. Related to the concern with risk, does successful diplomacy that produces a peace agreement in the conflict at hand lessen expected costs and therefore make authorizing new peacekeeping operations more attractive? To answer these questions, we examine UN peacekeeping authorization decisions over the period 1989–2016. Our results demonstrate that UN decisions to authorize new peacekeeping missions are connected to two forms of conflict management. First, successful attempts at peacemaking (evidence by peace agreements) increased the likelihood that a UN peacekeeping operation would be sent to that conflict in the aftermath of the agreement. We also demonstrate that the number of ongoing UN peacekeeping efforts are a strong negative predictor of whether or not the UN authorizes new missions. Theoretically, the concepts of perceived carrying capacity and risk, derived from other conflict management efforts, provided the explanatory bases for these effects.
2020. “Changing Standards or Political Whim? Evaluating Changes in the Content of US State Department Human Rights Reports following Presidential Transitions.” Journal of Human Rights (with Rebecca Cordell, K. Chad Clay, Christopher J. Fariss, and Reed M. Wood)
Abstract: The annual US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices represents one of the principal data sources used to generate multiple commonly used human rights measures. Despite the frequency with which these indicators are used in quantitative studies of human rights, scholars have rarely considered how the qualitative information in the source has varied over time. We contribute to this area of research by investigating the general changes in the amount of information included in the reports as well as the administrative-specific changes in this information. Using automated text analysis techniques, we find that the amount of information in the reports generally increases over time. However, our analysis also reveals that the rate (and direction) of change varies across different human rights topics and across presidential administrations. Consequently, we find evidence to support a changing standard of accountability as well as evidence that political considerations shape human rights reporting.
2020. "Revisionist Conflict and State Repression." International Area Studies Review. (online appendix and replications files)
Abstract: What kinds of international conflicts make states more likely to increase repression? I argue that the issues at stake in conflict may have different levels of domestic salience and may alter the domestic political status quo, thus increasing or decreasing a state’s or regime’s propensity to repress. I argue and find that democracies are most likely to increase repression when they are territorial revisionists, specifically increasing the use of imprisonment and torture. Autocratic states are more likely to increase repression during foreign policy-oriented disputes, as opposed to those fought over territory, which are less likely to escalate to full-scale war, and more likely to be domestically motivated. This project thus opens up the black box of international conflict to better understand how the reasons states fight abroad affects decisions to repress at home.
2018. "Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression." International Interactions 44 (1): 132-155. (with Shweta Moorthy), replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: Does hosting refugees affect state repression? While there have been numerous studies that examine the link between refugees and the spread of civil and international conflict, an examination of the systematic links between refugees and repression is lacking. We contend that researchers are missing a crucial link, as the dissent-repression nexus is crucial to understanding the development of armed conflict. Drawing upon logics of the relationship between refugees and the spread of conflict as well as economic capacity, we argue that increased numbers of refugees leads to increased repression. We contend that willingness to increase repression when hosting refugees is in part conditional on a host state’s economic capacity. We argue that, on the whole, the greater the population of refugees in a host state, repression becomes more likely. That said, we argue that increased economic capacity will moderate this relationship. We find empirical support for both predictions.
2016. "A Conditional Defense of the Dyadic Approach." International Studies Quarterly (with Paul F. Diehl)
Abstract: We contend that the dyadic approach should be employed as a theoretically informed choice. Although all unit-choices are simplifying decisions in modeling, the choice for a dyadic approach has not (yet) rendered itself useless and may, depending on the question and theory, be the most appropriate simplification of reality for a researcher to employ. Research should not necessarily aim to model reality for its own sake, but rather choose the simplifying conditions best suited to the question and theoretical framework. The basic structure of the dyad, a two actor interaction, is a useful simplification for multiple key questions in conflict research. As such, we offer a conditional defense of the dyadic approach, considering three elements: (1) the choice of level of analysis, (2) the assumption of independence of cases, and (3) the benefits accrued by past dyadic research.
2015. "Responding to Catastrophe: Repression Dynamics following Rapid-onset Natural Disasters." Journal of Conflict Resolution (with Reed M. Wood). replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: Natural disasters often cause significant human suffering. They may also provide incentives for states to escalate repression against their citizens. We argue that state authorities escalate repression in the wake of natural disasters because the combination of increased grievances and declining state control produced by disasters creates windows of opportunity for dissident mobilization and challenges to state authority. We also investigate the impact of the post-disaster humanitarian aid on this relationship. Specifically, we argue that inflows of aid in the immediate aftermath of disasters are likely to dampen the impact of disasters on repression. However, we expect that this effect is greater when aid flows to more democratic states We examine these inter-related hypotheses using cross-national data on immediate-onset natural disasters and state violations of physical integrity rights between 1977-2009 as well as newly collected foreign aid data disaggregated by sector. The results provide support for both our general argument as well as the corollary hypotheses.
2015. "Unpacking Territorial Disputes: Domestic Political Influences and War." Journal of Conflict Resolution (with Paul F. Diehl). replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: What distinguishes the militarized territorial disputes that escalate to war from those that do not? Although research has clearly established that territorial conflicts are especially war-prone, the understanding as to why this is the case is less developed when compared to domestic factors such as joint democracy. We explain that territorial conflicts are especially war prone when democratic and autocratic states are engaged in conflict against one another. Because of domestic concerns, democracies and autocracies value territory differently, generating a smaller bargaining space. Democracies will tend to be more resistant to settlement when territory is of a “public,” symbolic, or intangible value. Autocracies, on the other hand, are more likely to value the tangible qualities of territory, such as its resource value. This disparity in territorial goals makes mixed regime dyads more war prone when territory is disputed. We further believe that the smaller the winning coalition in autocracies, the more war prone they are against democracies. We test these propositions among all dyads as well as interstate rivals from 1816-2001 and find support for our theoretical framework.
2014. "Territorial Revision and State Repression." Journal of Peace Research. 51 (3): 375-87. replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: Does involvement in territorial conflict affect domestic repression? I argue that seeking to revise territory abroad will affect domestic repression, but conditionally on regime type and conflict severity. For democracies, there may be public pressure to deliver the good of territory. Because of this, territorial revision can lead to in-group/out-group dynamics at home, making it politically beneficial to increase repression domestically against groups seen as being opposed to the conflict. Autocracies may place a different value on contested territory, as they rely on the distribution of private goods to maintain support. While in-group/out-group dynamics may also be in play for autocracies, such states also face different types of constraints than democracies. Autocracies are more likely to use their military for domestic repression, and thus are more likely to simply maintain or reduce repression because the military is now being used abroad. These propositions are tested cross-nationally by examining repression when states are revisionists in conflicts over territory spanning from 1977-2001. The results of ordered logit analyses of state repression show that democratic states become more likely to increase repression when they are territorial revisionists, as those conflict-years become more deadly, while autocratic states are less likely to increase repression during the same periods.
2014. "Disputed Territory, Defensive Alliances, and Conflict Initiation." Conflict Management and Peace Science. 31 (2): 119-44. (with Toby J. Rider) replication files and online appendix
Abstract: In this study, we evaluate the effects of alliance behavior on the probability of militarized conflict initiation with specific emphasis placed on the issues at stake in the conflict. After much debate over the relationship between alliances and conflict, recent research suggests that specific types of alliances, namely defensive pacts for target states, decrease the likelihood that potential challengers will initiate militarized disputes. Revisiting the alliance–conflict relationship, we allow the type of issue at stake to vary in order to determine whether this deterrent effect holds even when the most salient of issues are under contention. Specifically, we introduce indicators for whether the two states are competing over territorial issues, a high-salience stake that is particularly conflict-prone. Using a number of different indicators for territorial competition and examining several different time periods, analyses suggest that targeted defensive alliances do indeed have a deterrent effect against named adversaries, even when the most salient of issues are at stake.
2012. "Staying the Course: Assessing the Durability of Peacekeeping Operations." Conflict Management and Peace Science. 29 (2): 127-47 (with J. Michael Greig)
Abstract: The use of peacekeeping to manage conflicts in the international system has grown since the end of the Cold War. While much attention has been devoted to what makes peacekeeping successful, the outcome of peacekeeping is ultimately tied to the willingness of the intervening actor(s) to “stay the course” and continue the mission until its objectives are complete. In this article we focus upon the empirical puzzle of peacekeeping missions’ sustainability. After states and international organizations overcome the collective action problem of forming a mission and deploying it, it is puzzling that so many missions drop out before completion. We adopt a competing risks framework in our analysis to identify the forces that determine whether peacekeepers stay until the end of a conflict or withdraw early. Our explanation argues that peacekeepers are more likely to stay the course as the capacity of the mission increases, the costs and risks of peacekeeping diminish, and traction towards peace is observed.
Projects Under Review
`Disaggregating Repression: Identifying Physical Integrity Rights Allegations in Annual Country Human Rights Reports.'' (with Rebecca Cordell, K. Chad Clay, Christopher J. Fariss, and Reed M. Wood), invited to revise and resubmit.
"International Conflict, Repression, and the Escalation of Civil Conflict." (with Heather Kopp and Bryce Reeder), under review.
`Disease and Dissent: Investigating How Epidemics Contribute to Social Unrest'' (with Rebecca Cordell and Reed M. Wood), under review.
The role of issues and domestic politics in international conflict, human rights and repression,
international alliances and their role in international conflict, international peacekeeping.
Data Collection Project
The Sub-National Analysis of Repression Project (NSF Award #1626775), with K. Chad Clay, Christopher J. Fariss, and Reed M. Wood, co-PIs and Rebecca Cordell
Peer-Reviewed Publications
2021. "Extant Commitment, Risk, and UN Peacekeeping Authorization." International Interactions (with Rebecca Cordell and Paul F. Diehl)
Abstract: Do aspects of current UN peacekeeping operations affect the willingness of that body to authorize new operations? Our theoretical arguments center on the capacity and costs of the organization – specifically the committed resources and risks associated with ongoing operations – with the assumption that greater existing commitments and perceived risks lessen the likelihood that the UN will create new operations. Related to the concern with risk, does successful diplomacy that produces a peace agreement in the conflict at hand lessen expected costs and therefore make authorizing new peacekeeping operations more attractive? To answer these questions, we examine UN peacekeeping authorization decisions over the period 1989–2016. Our results demonstrate that UN decisions to authorize new peacekeeping missions are connected to two forms of conflict management. First, successful attempts at peacemaking (evidence by peace agreements) increased the likelihood that a UN peacekeeping operation would be sent to that conflict in the aftermath of the agreement. We also demonstrate that the number of ongoing UN peacekeeping efforts are a strong negative predictor of whether or not the UN authorizes new missions. Theoretically, the concepts of perceived carrying capacity and risk, derived from other conflict management efforts, provided the explanatory bases for these effects.
2020. “Changing Standards or Political Whim? Evaluating Changes in the Content of US State Department Human Rights Reports following Presidential Transitions.” Journal of Human Rights (with Rebecca Cordell, K. Chad Clay, Christopher J. Fariss, and Reed M. Wood)
Abstract: The annual US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices represents one of the principal data sources used to generate multiple commonly used human rights measures. Despite the frequency with which these indicators are used in quantitative studies of human rights, scholars have rarely considered how the qualitative information in the source has varied over time. We contribute to this area of research by investigating the general changes in the amount of information included in the reports as well as the administrative-specific changes in this information. Using automated text analysis techniques, we find that the amount of information in the reports generally increases over time. However, our analysis also reveals that the rate (and direction) of change varies across different human rights topics and across presidential administrations. Consequently, we find evidence to support a changing standard of accountability as well as evidence that political considerations shape human rights reporting.
2020. "Revisionist Conflict and State Repression." International Area Studies Review. (online appendix and replications files)
Abstract: What kinds of international conflicts make states more likely to increase repression? I argue that the issues at stake in conflict may have different levels of domestic salience and may alter the domestic political status quo, thus increasing or decreasing a state’s or regime’s propensity to repress. I argue and find that democracies are most likely to increase repression when they are territorial revisionists, specifically increasing the use of imprisonment and torture. Autocratic states are more likely to increase repression during foreign policy-oriented disputes, as opposed to those fought over territory, which are less likely to escalate to full-scale war, and more likely to be domestically motivated. This project thus opens up the black box of international conflict to better understand how the reasons states fight abroad affects decisions to repress at home.
2018. "Refugees, Economic Capacity, and Host State Repression." International Interactions 44 (1): 132-155. (with Shweta Moorthy), replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: Does hosting refugees affect state repression? While there have been numerous studies that examine the link between refugees and the spread of civil and international conflict, an examination of the systematic links between refugees and repression is lacking. We contend that researchers are missing a crucial link, as the dissent-repression nexus is crucial to understanding the development of armed conflict. Drawing upon logics of the relationship between refugees and the spread of conflict as well as economic capacity, we argue that increased numbers of refugees leads to increased repression. We contend that willingness to increase repression when hosting refugees is in part conditional on a host state’s economic capacity. We argue that, on the whole, the greater the population of refugees in a host state, repression becomes more likely. That said, we argue that increased economic capacity will moderate this relationship. We find empirical support for both predictions.
2016. "A Conditional Defense of the Dyadic Approach." International Studies Quarterly (with Paul F. Diehl)
Abstract: We contend that the dyadic approach should be employed as a theoretically informed choice. Although all unit-choices are simplifying decisions in modeling, the choice for a dyadic approach has not (yet) rendered itself useless and may, depending on the question and theory, be the most appropriate simplification of reality for a researcher to employ. Research should not necessarily aim to model reality for its own sake, but rather choose the simplifying conditions best suited to the question and theoretical framework. The basic structure of the dyad, a two actor interaction, is a useful simplification for multiple key questions in conflict research. As such, we offer a conditional defense of the dyadic approach, considering three elements: (1) the choice of level of analysis, (2) the assumption of independence of cases, and (3) the benefits accrued by past dyadic research.
2015. "Responding to Catastrophe: Repression Dynamics following Rapid-onset Natural Disasters." Journal of Conflict Resolution (with Reed M. Wood). replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: Natural disasters often cause significant human suffering. They may also provide incentives for states to escalate repression against their citizens. We argue that state authorities escalate repression in the wake of natural disasters because the combination of increased grievances and declining state control produced by disasters creates windows of opportunity for dissident mobilization and challenges to state authority. We also investigate the impact of the post-disaster humanitarian aid on this relationship. Specifically, we argue that inflows of aid in the immediate aftermath of disasters are likely to dampen the impact of disasters on repression. However, we expect that this effect is greater when aid flows to more democratic states We examine these inter-related hypotheses using cross-national data on immediate-onset natural disasters and state violations of physical integrity rights between 1977-2009 as well as newly collected foreign aid data disaggregated by sector. The results provide support for both our general argument as well as the corollary hypotheses.
2015. "Unpacking Territorial Disputes: Domestic Political Influences and War." Journal of Conflict Resolution (with Paul F. Diehl). replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: What distinguishes the militarized territorial disputes that escalate to war from those that do not? Although research has clearly established that territorial conflicts are especially war-prone, the understanding as to why this is the case is less developed when compared to domestic factors such as joint democracy. We explain that territorial conflicts are especially war prone when democratic and autocratic states are engaged in conflict against one another. Because of domestic concerns, democracies and autocracies value territory differently, generating a smaller bargaining space. Democracies will tend to be more resistant to settlement when territory is of a “public,” symbolic, or intangible value. Autocracies, on the other hand, are more likely to value the tangible qualities of territory, such as its resource value. This disparity in territorial goals makes mixed regime dyads more war prone when territory is disputed. We further believe that the smaller the winning coalition in autocracies, the more war prone they are against democracies. We test these propositions among all dyads as well as interstate rivals from 1816-2001 and find support for our theoretical framework.
2014. "Territorial Revision and State Repression." Journal of Peace Research. 51 (3): 375-87. replication files and online appendix.
Abstract: Does involvement in territorial conflict affect domestic repression? I argue that seeking to revise territory abroad will affect domestic repression, but conditionally on regime type and conflict severity. For democracies, there may be public pressure to deliver the good of territory. Because of this, territorial revision can lead to in-group/out-group dynamics at home, making it politically beneficial to increase repression domestically against groups seen as being opposed to the conflict. Autocracies may place a different value on contested territory, as they rely on the distribution of private goods to maintain support. While in-group/out-group dynamics may also be in play for autocracies, such states also face different types of constraints than democracies. Autocracies are more likely to use their military for domestic repression, and thus are more likely to simply maintain or reduce repression because the military is now being used abroad. These propositions are tested cross-nationally by examining repression when states are revisionists in conflicts over territory spanning from 1977-2001. The results of ordered logit analyses of state repression show that democratic states become more likely to increase repression when they are territorial revisionists, as those conflict-years become more deadly, while autocratic states are less likely to increase repression during the same periods.
2014. "Disputed Territory, Defensive Alliances, and Conflict Initiation." Conflict Management and Peace Science. 31 (2): 119-44. (with Toby J. Rider) replication files and online appendix
Abstract: In this study, we evaluate the effects of alliance behavior on the probability of militarized conflict initiation with specific emphasis placed on the issues at stake in the conflict. After much debate over the relationship between alliances and conflict, recent research suggests that specific types of alliances, namely defensive pacts for target states, decrease the likelihood that potential challengers will initiate militarized disputes. Revisiting the alliance–conflict relationship, we allow the type of issue at stake to vary in order to determine whether this deterrent effect holds even when the most salient of issues are under contention. Specifically, we introduce indicators for whether the two states are competing over territorial issues, a high-salience stake that is particularly conflict-prone. Using a number of different indicators for territorial competition and examining several different time periods, analyses suggest that targeted defensive alliances do indeed have a deterrent effect against named adversaries, even when the most salient of issues are at stake.
2012. "Staying the Course: Assessing the Durability of Peacekeeping Operations." Conflict Management and Peace Science. 29 (2): 127-47 (with J. Michael Greig)
Abstract: The use of peacekeeping to manage conflicts in the international system has grown since the end of the Cold War. While much attention has been devoted to what makes peacekeeping successful, the outcome of peacekeeping is ultimately tied to the willingness of the intervening actor(s) to “stay the course” and continue the mission until its objectives are complete. In this article we focus upon the empirical puzzle of peacekeeping missions’ sustainability. After states and international organizations overcome the collective action problem of forming a mission and deploying it, it is puzzling that so many missions drop out before completion. We adopt a competing risks framework in our analysis to identify the forces that determine whether peacekeepers stay until the end of a conflict or withdraw early. Our explanation argues that peacekeepers are more likely to stay the course as the capacity of the mission increases, the costs and risks of peacekeeping diminish, and traction towards peace is observed.
Projects Under Review
`Disaggregating Repression: Identifying Physical Integrity Rights Allegations in Annual Country Human Rights Reports.'' (with Rebecca Cordell, K. Chad Clay, Christopher J. Fariss, and Reed M. Wood), invited to revise and resubmit.
"International Conflict, Repression, and the Escalation of Civil Conflict." (with Heather Kopp and Bryce Reeder), under review.
`Disease and Dissent: Investigating How Epidemics Contribute to Social Unrest'' (with Rebecca Cordell and Reed M. Wood), under review.
